From the
WSJ:
An Obama administration assessment of the Iran nuclear deal provided to Congress has led a number of lawmakers to conclude the U.S. and world powers will never get to the bottom of the country's alleged efforts to build an atomic weapon, and that Tehran won't be pressed to fully explain its past.
In a report to Capitol Hill last week, the administration said it was unlikely Iran would admit to having pursued a covert nuclear weapons program, and that such an acknowledgment wasn't critical to verifying Iranian commitments in the future.
Details of the report, which haven't been previously disclosed, indicate the deal reached this month could go ahead even if United Nations inspectors never ascertain conclusively whether Iran pursued a nuclear weapons program—something Tehran has repeatedly denied.
....The documents included classified and unclassified sections on the verification process that will be used to ensure Iran is abiding by the agreement. The package also includes a section on Iran's future nuclear research and development plans.
On Iran's alleged past weapons work, the Obama administration said it concluded: "An Iranian admission of its past nuclear weapons program is unlikely and is not necessary for purposes of verifying commitments going forward," said a copy of the assessment viewed by The Wall Street Journal.
"U.S. confidence on this front is based in large part on what we believe we already know about Iran's past activities," the report said. "The United States has shared with the IAEA the relevant information, and crafted specific measures that will enable inspectors to establish confidence that previously reported Iranian [weaponization] activities are not ongoing."
Omri Ceren of The Israel Project released a quick list (via email) of previous administration promises to ensure that PMDs were fully investigated in any agreement:
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Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State, Dec 12 2013 --
There are three places in the agreement that speak to the possible military dimensions of Iran's program. In the first paragraph, it talks about having the comprehensive agreement address all remaining concerns. That is a reference to their possible military dimensions. It talks about the need to address past and present practices, which is the IAEA terminology for possible military dimensions, including Parchin... So we have had very direct conversations with Iran about all of these. They understand completely the meaning of the words in this agreement, and we intend to support the IAEA in its efforts to deal with possible military dimensions, including Parchin.(
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg87828/html/CHRG-113shrg87828.htm)
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Marie Harf, State spokesperson, April 23, 2015 --
QUESTION: But you can’t say with definitive clarity at this point that, for example, inspectors will be allowed into Parchin? -- MS. HARF: Well, we would find it, I think, very difficult to imagine a JCPA that did not require such access at Parchin. (
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/04/240324.htm)
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John Kirby, State spokesperson, June 17 2015 --
And again, I'd tell you that that interpretation of his comments is incorrect. Let me, if I could, read to you what he actually said to you in your question: 'On something like possible military dimensions' – this is from yesterday – 'the JPOA refers to that and says that it’s got to be addressed in the context of the final product. And that remains true; it has to be. And we have to resolve our questions about it with specificity. Access is very, very critical. It’s always been critical from day one; it remains critical. And we defined that at Lausanne, and those are sorts of fundamental outlines, if you will.' Within that context, there is leeway to define further certain things, but not this one.(
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/06/243942.htm)
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