During the 1930s, the combination of the Great Depression and the memory of
tragic losses in World War I contributed to pushing American public opinion and
policy toward isolationism. Isolationists advocated non-involvement in European
and Asian conflicts and non-entanglement in international politics. Although the
United States took measures to avoid political and military conflicts across the
oceans, it continued to expand economically and protect its interests in Latin
America. The leaders of the isolationist movement drew upon history to bolster
their position. In his Farewell Address, President George Washington had
advocated non-involvement in European wars and politics. For much of the
nineteenth century, the expanse of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans had made it
possible for the United States to enjoy a kind of "free security" and remain
largely detached from Old World conflicts. During World War I, however,
President Woodrow Wilson
made a case for U.S.
intervention in the conflict and a U.S. interest in maintaining a peaceful
world order. Nevertheless, the American experience in that war served to bolster
the arguments of isolationists; they argued that marginal U.S. interests in that
conflict did not justify the number of U.S. casualties.
President Woodrow Wilson
In the wake of the World War I, a report by Senator
Gerald P.
Nye, a Republican from North Dakota, fed this belief by claiming that
American bankers and arms manufacturers had pushed for U.S. involvement for
their own profit. The 1934 publication of the book
Merchants
of Death by
H.C. Engelbrecht and
F. C.
Hanighen, followed by the 1935 tract "War Is a Racket" by
decorated Marine Corps General
Smedley D. Butler both
served to increase popular suspicions of wartime profiteering and influence
public opinion in the direction of neutrality. Many Americans became determined
not to be tricked by banks and industries into making such great sacrifices
again. The reality of a worldwide economic depression and the need for increased
attention to domestic problems only served to bolster the idea that the United
States should isolate itself from troubling events in Europe. During the
interwar period, the U.S. Government repeatedly chose non-entanglement over
participation or intervention as the appropriate response to international
questions. Immediately following the First World War,
Congress rejected U.S. membership in
the League of Nations. Some members of Congress opposed membership in
the League out of concern that it would draw the United States into European
conflicts, although ultimately the collective security clause sank the
possibility of U.S. participation. During the 1930s, the League proved
ineffectual in the face of growing militarism, partly due to the U.S. decision
not to participate.
Senator Gerald Nye
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and subsequent push to gain control over
larger expanses of Northeast China in 1931 led President
Herbert
Hoover and his Secretary of State,
Henry
Stimson, to establish the
Stimson Doctrine, which
stated that the United States would not recognize the territory gained by
aggression and in violation of international agreements. With the Stimson
Doctrine, the United States expressed concern over the aggressive action without
committing itself to any direct involvement or intervention. Other conflicts,
including the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War, also
resulted in virtually no official commitment or action from the United States
Government. Upon taking office, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt tended to
see a necessity for the United States to participate more actively in
international affairs, but his ability to apply his personal outlook to foreign
policy was limited by the strength of isolationist sentiment in the U.S.
Congress. In 1933, President Roosevelt proposed a Congressional measure that
would have granted him the right to consult with other nations to place pressure
on aggressors in international conflicts. The bill ran into strong opposition
from the leading isolationists in Congress, including progressive politicians
such as Senators Hiram Johnson of California, William Borah of Idaho, and Robert
La Follette of Wisconsin. In 1935, controversy over U.S. participation in the
World Court elicited similar opposition. As tensions rose in Europe over Nazi
Germany's aggressive maneuvers, Congress pushed through a series of
Neutrality Acts, which
served to prevent American ships and citizens from becoming entangled in outside
conflicts. Roosevelt lamented the restrictive nature of the acts, but because he
still required Congressional support for his domestic New Deal policies, he
reluctantly acquiesced.
The isolationists were a diverse group, including progressives and conservatives,
business owners and peace activists, but because they faced no consistent,
organized opposition from internationalists, their ideology triumphed time and
again. Roosevelt appeared to accept the strength of the isolationist elements in
Congress until 1937. In that year, as the situation in Europe continued to grow
worse and the Second Sino-Japanese War began in Asia, the President gave a
speech in which he likened international aggression to a disease that other
nations must work to "quarantine." At that time, however, Americans were still
not prepared to risk their lives and livelihoods for peace abroad. Even the
outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 did not suddenly diffuse popular desire to
avoid international entanglements. Instead, public opinion shifted from favoring
complete neutrality to supporting limited U.S. aid to the Allies short of actual
intervention in the war. The surprise Japanese attack on the U.S. Navy at
Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 served to convince
the majority of Americans that the United States should enter the war on the
side of the Allies.